Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover , the stability condition ( 
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [3] was first introduced by John Maynard Smith in 1973 [2] . He invented the important concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that resist invasion of other strategies in infinitely large populations.
Prisoner's dilemma (PD) game [4] studies cooperation between unrelated individuals. In non-repeated PD,individuals are either cooperators or defectors, acting accordingly whenever two of them interact. They both receive R upon mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A defector exploiting a cooperator gets an amount T and the exploited cooperator receives S, such that 1 T>R>P>S .So, it is best to defect, regardless of the opponent's decision, which in turns makes cooperators unable to resist invasion by defectors.
In this paper, we study the effect of non-uniform interaction rates on evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated PD game [1] , via benefit and cost dilemma .
In section 1, we present the classical approach of the replicator equation of PD with uniform interaction rate between any two individuals. This rate does not depend on the strategies of these individuals. In section 2,we assume that the interaction rates are not uniform. For example, players who use the same strategy might interact more frequently than players who use different strategies.
Non-uniform interaction rates lead to non-linear fitness functions and therefore allow richer dynamics than the classical replicator equation, which is based on linear fitness functions. If strategy D is a strict Nash equilibrium [5] , then it remains uninvadable for positive non-uniform interaction rates. If D dominates C then non-uniform interaction rates can introduce a pair of interior equilibria; one of them is stable the other one is unstable. If C and D coexist, then nonuniform interaction rates cannot change the qualitative dynamics, but alter the location of the stable equilibrium.
1 Dynamical PD game with uniform interaction rate Consider PD game between two players each having two strategies C(cooperation) and D (defection) and Cooperator pay a benefit b at a cost c to his Cooperator opponent, whereas Defector opponent only receive a benefit b [6] . Then we have payoff matrix
where, b > c > 0.We denote by x and y the frequency of individuals adopting strategy C and D, respectively. We have x + y = 1.
In case of uniform interaction rate between any two individuals. We assume that interaction rate is independent of their strategies. The selection dynamics can be described by replicator equation [7] 
The fitness of C and D players are linear functions of x and y, given by
The entire population will eventually consist of Defectors ,since b > b−c and 0 > −c .The only stable equilibrium is x = 0. D is a strict Nash equilibrium,and therefore an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
Stability in dynamical PD game with nonuniform interaction rates
Suppose that an interaction between two players depends on their strategies.
Let r 1 , r 2 , r 3 be reaction rates between each two players and r 1 , r 2 , r 3 > 0 .
where,r 1 is an interaction rate of Cooperator with another Cooperator, r 2 is an interaction rate of Cooperator with Defector, and r 3 is an interaction rate of Defector with another Defector.
For uniform interaction rates r 1 = r 2 = r 3 the strategy D dominates the strategy C. Hence, eventually the entire population will consist of defectors.
However, if players only interact with opponents of the same strategy, then cooperators cannot be exploited by defectors. In this case, where r 2 = 0 and r 1 , r 3 > 0 ,cooperation is the dominant strategy, because b − c > 0.Assume r 2 = 0 which means that cooperators and defectors do interact. Without loss of generality, assume that r 2 = 1.
The fitness of individuals is determined by the average payoff over a large number of interactions. Therefore, the fitness of C and D players are non-linear functions of x and y, given by
The replicator equations can be reduced tȯ
where,
The equilibrium points are either on the boundary or in the interior. The boundary points x = 0 is stable equilibrium while x = 1 is unstable equilibrium.
If f C − f D = 0 and x + y = 1then we have two interior equilibrium are given by
In case of non-uniform interaction rate ,the selection dynamics depend on the size of r 1 r 3 relative to ρ 2 .
[1] where,
If r 1 r 3 < ( have the bifurcation [8] point at
If r 
